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A	coercive	policy-making	state?	How	the	EU	is
alienating	its	citizens
The	remit	of	EU	institutions	has	expanded	inexorably,	writes	Jeremy	Richardson,	all	while	their	policy-making	style
has	shifted	from	a	consensus-based	process	towards	a	more	coercive,	top-down	one.	At	the	same	time,	the	EU’s
focus	on	interest	groups	might	have	also	exacerbated	the	problem	of	the	democratic	deficit	by	distancing	the	EU
from	broader	public	opinion.	These	realities	have	contributed	to	both	Brexit	and	the	broader	‘populist	revolt’	across
Member	States.
It	is	conventional	wisdom	that	immigration	played	a	central	role	in	the	2016	EU	Referendum.	But	what	about	the
long-term	role	of	European	elites	and	EU	institutions	in	(unwittingly)	creating	the	seismic	conditions	for	the	Brexit	vote
in	the	first	place?	How	did	the	increasing	alienation	(‘the	populist	revolt’)	from	the	EU	arise?	Is	it	that	voters	are	ill-
informed	about	the	benefits	of	the	EU,	or	is	that	European	elites	have	spent	60	years	building	a	policy-making	state,
accompanied	by	a	policy-making	style	which	has	become	increasingly	coercive?
The	EU’s	paradox	is	that	it	has	achieved	so	much,	from	peace	within	its	borders	to	practical	day-to-day	matters	such
as	cleaner	water,	yet	has	managed	to	so	alienate	many	of	its	citizens	that	the	future	of	the	EU	is	under	threat.	The
case	of	motor	vehicle	safety	is	a	typical	example	of	this	paradox.	It	is	a		technical	issue	yet	is	also	very	important	for
most	citizens.	Few	would	dispute	the	need	for	some	common	international	standards.	The	EU,	as	is	often	the	case,
met	this	need.	Thus,	on	1	November	2014	new	safety	features	became	mandatory	for	every	new	car,	van,	truck,	and
bus	sold	in	the	EU.
Yet	this	example	would	probably	be	seen	by		UKIP	as	Brussels	‘interference’.	Somehow,	the	EU’s	public	policy-
making	has	become	increasingly	‘framed’	as	unjustified	interference	in	national	sovereignty.	Part	of	the	explanation	is
that	even	very	technical	legislation	is	actually		coercive.	It	is	not	optional.	One	irony	of	Brexit	is	that	a	huge	proportion
of	sensible	public	policy	under	which	British	citizens	now	live	emanates	from	the	EU	and	will	likely	stay	in	place	long
after	Britain’s	exit.	Some	laws	will	be	repealed	or	amended,	but	a	significant	proportion	will	be	unchanged.	They	were
introduced	by	the	EU	for	good	reasons,	and	were	often	supported	by	the	UK	governments.
The	EU	has	not	passed	a	lot	of	bad	legislation,	but	it	has	constructed	a	superstructure	of	public	policy	via	a	process
of	Brussels-based	elite	policy-making	which	has	raced	ahead	of	what	European	peoples	want.	At	the	same	time,	the
EU	has	acquired	the	power	to	decide	a	vast	range	public	policies	affecting	its	citizens.	This	steady	transfer	of
sovereignty	means	that	the	EU	has	begun	to	look	much	more	like	a	sovereign	state	than	a	collection	of	sovereign
states	working	together	to	solve	problems.
All	of	the	EU’s	institutions	(but	especially	the	European	Commission)	have	been	very	adept	at	task	expansion.	What
is	a	natural	law	of	organizational	behaviour	captures	the	central	issue	in	the	UK’s	referendum.	The	Leavers	were
right	in	arguing	that	the	EU	had	extended	its	policy	remit	at	the	expense	of	the	Member	States.	The	supremacy	of	EU
law	and	the	powers	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	are	the	most	visible	examples	of	this.	However,	if	one	institution
is	to	be	the	focus	of	anti-EU	sentiment,	the	Commission	should	take	pride	of	place.	It	has	been	the	main	policy
entrepreneur.	It	is	a	body	of	public	servants	both	committed	to	the	European	ideal	and	looking	for	work.
Similarly,	the	European	Parliament,	though		containing		Eurosceptics,	has	also	been	a	pro-integration	legislature
looking	for	work,	wanting		more	European	integration	and	more	powers	for	itself.	Even	the	Member	States	have	been
active	in	the	tectonic	shift	of	power	to	the	supranational	level.	The	argument	that	intractable	policy	problems	are	best
solved	at	the	EU	level	has	generally	held	sway,	notwithstanding	opt-outs	and	multi-speed	integration.	Even	deeply
Eurosceptic	Member	States	like	the	UK	have	agreed	to	increased	Europeanization	and	have	occasionally	been
advocates,	such	the	UK’s	strong	support	for	the	Single	European	Act.
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Finally,	there	is	the	role	of	interest	groups	in	Europeanization.	A	striking	aspect	of	the	process		is	the	development	of
a	dense	EU-level	interest	group	system.	Many	observers	(including	me)	saw	this	trend	as	going	a	long	way	to
addressing	the	EU’s	democratic	deficit.	Many	groups,	such	as	women’s	and	environmental	groups	concluded	that
they	would	gain	more	policy	concessions	at	the	European	level.	What	had	been	denied	at	the	national	level	was
often	granted	at	the	EU	level.	Similarly,	business	groups	have	seen	benefit	in	working	under	one	set	of	Euro
regulations	than	under	many	different	national	regulations.	It	is	no	accident	that	most	conventional	interest	groups	in
Britain	were	in	favour	of	‘remain’.	The	result	has	been	the	emergence	of	an	almost	symbiotic	relationship	between
the	Commission,	particularly,	and	interest	groups.
However,	the	close	integration	of	interest	groups	into	Commission	deliberations	might	have	had	the	perverse	effect
of	distancing	the	EU	from	broader	public	opinion.	The	shift	in	focus	from	the	national	to	the	EU	level	by	interest
groups	might	have	exacerbated	the	problem	of	the	democratic	deficit.	Interest	groups	do	not	equal	‘the	public’	as
was	seen	in	the	UK’s	referendum.	Moreover,	the	interest	groups	could	not	deliver	the	votes	of	their	members	for	the
remain	cause.
We	have	seen	the	gradual	creation	of	a	broadly-based	European	elite	in	favour	of	a	continuous	process	of
integration,	a		Brussels	‘group	think’,	quite	detached	from	ordinary	folk	in	the	fish	and	chip	shop	queue	in,	say,
Hartlepool.	Head	in	the	sand,	the	Euro-elite	created	a	vacuum	at	the	national	level,	which	new	anti-EU	parties	have
filled.
To	be	fair	to	the	EU	institutions,	particularly	the	Commission,	they	some	time	ago	recognised	that	it	was	time	to	ease
off	on	the	accelerator,	thus	reducing	the	flow	of	new	legislation	and	also	trying	to	have	better	regulation.	This
recognition	was	much	too	late.	European	elites	really	had	become	out	of	touch	with	their	peoples	and	were	very	slow
to	spot	what	was	going	on	under	their	very	noses.
The	EU’s	expansionary	trajectory	was	bound	to	lead	to	the	EU	hitting	the		buffers,	unless	one	believes	that	notions	of
national	sovereignty	were	long	since	dead	and	buried.	National	leaders	might	have	subscribed	to	this	view,	to	at	least
some	degree,	but	their	peoples	had	not	abandoned	notions	of	the	independent	nation	state	and	national	identity,
however	unrealistic	as	concepts	they	might	be	in	a	globalised	world.
The	substance	of	EU	integration	has	not	been	the	only	problem.	The	EU	policy	style	has	to	some	degree	shifted	from
a	consensus-based	process	of	policy	formation	(that	is	a	process	of	consensus	formation	within	the	European	elite)
towards	a	more	coercive,	top-down	policy	style.	EU	policy-formulation	is	characterised	by	bargaining	and	consensus,
but	there	is	often	a	mailed	fist	within	that	velvet	glove	to	subsequently	enforce	that	consensus.	Once	in	place,	EU	law
has	bite.	However	‘good’	EU	laws	might	be,	it	is	the	EU’s	bite	that	has	grabbed	the	attention	of	voters.
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The	irony	of	Brexit		is	that	a	different	kind	of	EU	might	emerge.	It	is	clear	that	‘ever	closer	union’	is	going	to	be	a	hard
sell.	The	EU	needs	to	become	more	minimalist	and	less	coercive.	If	the	EU’s	institutions	make	this	(big!)	cultural
shift,	Britain	need	not	leave	the	EU	after	all.
__________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	article	in	Political	Quarterly.
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